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RETHINKING THE FEDERAL INDIAN STATUS TEST: 
A LOOK AT THE SUPREME COURT’S 
CLASSIFICATION OF THE FREEDMEN OF THE FIVE 
CIVILIZED TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA 
 
Clint Summers• 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Federal courts have used the same test to determine Indian 
status in the context of criminal jurisdiction for over 150 years: they 
require Indian blood (meaning a genealogical tie to an Indian tribe) 
and membership in a federally recognized tribe.1 Since the test 
(known hereafter as the “Rogers test”) was first developed, legal 
scholars and courts alike have agreed that the racial prong (Indian 
blood) is necessary.2 Furthermore, when the Supreme Court finally 
had occasion to decide whether federal classifications based on 
Indian status violate the Fourteenth Amendment, it held that Indian 
status is not a racial classification; rather, because Indian status is 
dependent on membership in a federally recognized tribe, it is a 
permissible “political classification.”3 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
• JD Candidate, 2019, the University of Tulsa College of Law. I am a member of 
the Muscogee (Creek) Nation. This paper represents my own opinions based on 
current federal Indian law and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of my 
tribe. Thanks to Barbara Bucholtz, Russell Christopher, Dallas Jones, Deric 
McClellan, Robert McClendon, Judith Royster, and to the editors with the 
American Indian Law Journal for their helpful comments. Any errors are my 
own. 
1 United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 573 (1846). Civil jurisdiction is not 
based on Indian status, but on membership status. Montana v. United States, 450 
U.S. 544, 564 (1981). 
2 See Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: A Journey 
through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIZ. L.R. 503, 518-20 (1976); United States 
v. Prentiss, 273 F.3d 1277, 1280-81 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Torres, 
733 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1984). 
3 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552 (1974); United States v. Antelope, 430 
U.S. 641, 645 (1977); see also Clinton, supra note 2, at n.60. Importantly, the 
Supreme Court did not simply ignore the racial prong of the test; the issue of 
non-racially Indian members had not arisen for over a century because most 
Freedmen were granted membership after the Civil War. Therefore, all members 
considered by the Court were racially Indian members. Additionally, once 
Oklahoma transitioned from Indian Territory to the state we know today, Indian 
country decreased significantly, making it less likely that a crime committed by 
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However, a new development in federal Indian law has 
arisen which neither legal scholars nor courts have had the 
opportunity to consider: Cherokee Nation v. Nash.4 Following the 
court’s holding in Cherokee Nation, over 25,000 Freedmen5 became 
Cherokee members.6 This decision is highly significant—the 
Cherokee Nation is the largest federally recognized tribe in America 
with over 360,000 members and growing.7 According to Supreme 
Court precedent, these new members are not Indians and as such are 
not entitled to the benefit of federal criminal jurisdiction; instead 
they are subject to state criminal laws which can have more severe 
penalties for the same crime.8  
No one has yet argued that denying a Freedman a federal 
benefit provided to other members solely because of his race 
violates the Equal Protection Clause. This paper fills the gap. This 
paper does not argue that Supreme Court precedent is wrong. On the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
or against a Freedmen would meet the criteria necessary to have a chance of 
going to federal court. See generally Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 
27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. # (1995). 
4 Cherokee Nation v. Nash, 267 F. Supp. 3d 86, 140 (D.D.C. 2017). 
5 Freedmen can also refer to ex-slaves in general. “Freedmen” is used gender-
neutrally. It is also used to refer both to ex-slaves of the tribes and to African-
Americans who were never slaves of their respective tribes, such as the 
Freedmen of the Seminoles, many of whom fled their masters in other parts of 
the pre-Civil War South to live with the Seminoles. See KEVIN MULROY, THE 
SEMINOLE FREEDMEN: A HISTORY, xxvii-xxviii, (2007); see also M. THOMAS 
BAILEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN INDIAN TERRITORY: A STORY OF AVARICE, 
DISCRIMINATION, AND OPPORTUNISM 48 (1972); see also Linda Reese, 
Freedmen, OKLAHOMA HISTORY SOCIETY, 
http://www.okhistory.org/publications/enc/entry.php?entry=FR016. 
6 Cherokee Nation, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 140; Michael Dekker, Cherokees begin 
processing Freedmen descendants for tribal citizenship, TULSA WORLD (Sept. 8, 
2017), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/state/cherokees-begin-processing-
Freedmen-descendants-for-tribal-citizenship/article_555b6279-79fe-5571-b2a2-
c88bb2005f2d.html [https://perma.cc/5SVS-FKJD]. 
7 Cherokee Nation, About the Nation, http://www.cherokee.org/About-The-
Nation [https://perma.cc/AM33-96PD]; see also National Center for Education 
Statistics, Table 1.3. Largest American Indian and Alaska Native tribes 
according to number of self-identified members, by race and tribal group: 2000, 
https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2008/nativetrends/tables/table_1_3.asp 
[https://perma.cc/QD6D-MU59] (The Cherokees are at the top of the list for 
American Indian tribes.) 
8 Lucas v. United States, 163 U.S. 612, 617 (1896); Alberty v. United States, 
162 U.S. 499, 501 (1896). In Murphy, the defendant challenges the State of 
Oklahoma’s jurisdiction primarily because if he were availed of state 
jurisdiction, he would get out of his death penalty conviction. Oklahoma allows 
the death penalty while the federal government does not; hence, the benefit of 
being subject to federal criminal jurisdiction. 
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contrary, it argues that the Rogers test is facially constitutional as 
demonstrated by Supreme Court precedent; however, this paper 
argues that the Rogers test is unconstitutional under Supreme Court 
precedent as applied to the Freedmen and other non-racial members. 
The Rogers test as applied to the Freedmen also violates federal 
policy in significant ways. This paper offers a simple solution: 
change the Rogers test, which is antiquated and redundant. Doing so 
would place all Indians on equal footing, give power back to the 
tribes—whose rigid membership requirements meet the Rogers 
test’s current standard—and create judicial efficiencies, which will 
be necessary if the Murphy mandate issues. 
Prior to offering a roadmap of this paper, a definition of key 
terms is helpful. “Indian” is a term of art in federal Indian law, used 
to describe racial members of a tribe. With the exception of 
Freedman, all members of a federally-recognized tribe are Indians. 
All Indians, however, are not members, because the federal 
government does not recognize every tribe.9 “Freedmen” are 
members, but not Indians, unless they are biologically related to a 
racial Indian. This paper uses “Freedmen” to refer to the Freedmen 
of the Five Civilized Tribes of Oklahoma.10 
This paper begins by discussing the history of the Freedmen. 
This is followed by a discussion of the basics of criminal jurisdiction 
in Indian country, which is necessary to understand in order to see 
that Freedmen members are not entitled to these jurisdictional 
benefits. This paper next argues that under current law, the 
Freedmen of the Five Civilized Tribes are members but not Indians; 
therefore, they are not entitled to federal criminal jurisdiction. To 
resolve constitutional and federal policy violations resulting from 
the Freedmen not being Indians, this paper proposes removing the 
first prong of the Rogers test. This change would fix the equal 
protection and federal policy pitfalls and increase judicial 
efficiency, ultimately giving power back to the tribes to determine 
who is Indian. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See FELIX COHEN, Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian law, 84-93 (2012). 
10 The Five Civilized Tribes of Oklahoma consist of the Creeks, Cherokees, 
Seminoles, Choctaws, and Chickasaws. All are currently headquartered in 
eastern Oklahoma. See KATJA MAY, AFRICAN AMERICANS AND NATIVE 
AMERICANS IN THE CREEK AND CHEROKEE NATIONS, 1830S TO 1920S, 3 (1996); 
see also LITTLEFIELD, supra note 3, at 3 (“[The Creeks, Cherokees, Seminoles, 
Choctaws, and Chickasaws] are known as . . . the Five Civilized Tribes because 
of their rapid acculturation in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.”) 
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II. THE FREEDMEN MEMBERS OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES OF 
OKLAHOMA 
 
As an initial matter, it is helpful to understand where the 
Freedmen come from and why one should care about their Indian 
status now, considering that Freedmen membership is not a novel 
issue. Prior to the Civil War, all of the Oklahoma tribes practiced 
slavery.11 Each tribe brought their slaves with them when they were 
removed to Indian Territory12 in the first half of the 19th century.13 
All Five Civilized Tribes joined sides with the Confederacy during 
the Civil War.14 After the Confederacy lost to the Union, the Five 
Civilized Tribes were forced to free their slaves and grant them full 
membership rights as a condition of being admitted back into the 
Union.15 One of these four tribes—the Cherokee Nation, which is 
the largest of the tribes in Oklahoma—changed its constitution in 
2007 to exclude Freedmen from its membership rolls.16 This became 
the climax of a more than century-long legal battle between the 
Cherokee Freedmen and the Cherokee Nation, ending in 2017 with 
a U.S. District Court granting Cherokee Freedmen all the rights of 
native members.17 Since this decision went into effect, more than 
25,000 Freedmen have claimed membership in the Cherokee 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Reese, supra note 5; see also ANNIE HELOISE ABEL, THE AMERICAN INDIAN 
UNDER RECONSTRUCTION (1925). 
12 Indian Territory refers to pre-statehood Oklahoma. Prior to 1907, when 
Oklahoma became a state, Indian Territory was occupied and owned through 
treaties by the Five Civilized Tribes. This paper uses “Oklahoma” and “Indian 
Territory” interchangeably. However, when “Indian Territory” is used, it always 
refers to Oklahoma prior to its becoming a state. See generally COHEN, supra 
note 9, at 288-91. 
13 Reese, supra note 5.  
14 James L. Huston, Civil War Era, OKLAHOMA HISTORY SOCIETY, 
https://www.okhistory.org/publications/enc/entry.php?entry=CI011. 
15 Treaty with the Creeks, 1866, U.S.—Creek Nation of Indians, art. 9, July 19, 
1866, 14 Stat. 799; Treaty with the Seminole, 1866, U.S.—Seminole Nation of 
Indians, July 19, 1866, 14 Stat. 755; Treaty with the Choctaw and Chickasaw, 
1866, U.S.—Choctaw and Chickasaw Nation of Indians, July 10, 1866, 14 Stat. 
769; Treaty with the Cherokee, 1866, U.S.—Cherokee Nation of Indians, July 
19, 1866, 14 Stat. 799; see also BAILEY, supra note 5, at 123; Cherokee Nation, 
267 F.Supp. 3d 86 at 140; LITTLEFIELD supra note 3, at 51. The Chickasaw 
Nation is the only tribe in Oklahoma not to recognize the citizenship of its 
Freedmen in a treaty. See LITTLEFIELD, supra note 3, at 51. 
16 See DANIEL F. LITTLEFIELD, JR., THE CHEROKEE FREEDMEN: FROM 
EMANCIPATION TO AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (1978). 
17 Cherokee Nation, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 140. 
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Nation.18 The next question courts will have to decide is whether 
these Freedmen have a right to the criminal jurisdiction statutes to 
which native members are entitled. 
A. History of the Freedmen 
Like European-Americans, many Indian tribal members of 
the Five Civilized Tribes owned slaves of African descent.19 
However, unlike European Americans, the Indians of the Five 
Civilized Tribes generally treated their slaves well.20 In fact, there 
are instances of slaves fleeing their masters in the south to live with 
Indian tribes, such as the Seminoles, prior to the tribes’ removal to 
Oklahoma.21 Slavery came with the Indian tribes who were moved 
to Oklahoma on the Trail of Tears.22 It is estimated that around the 
year 1839, the Creeks23 owned around 400 slaves, the Cherokees 
owned around 1,000 slaves, the Seminoles owned around 1,000 
slaves and former slaves (many were adopted into the tribe even 
before the tribe was moved to Indian Territory), and the Choctaws 
owned around 600 slaves.24 
The end of the Civil War signaled the end of slavery for both 
the United States and the Five Civilized Tribes.25 But the war had 
tragic consequences for the Five Civilized Tribes.  Although the 
Choctaws and Chickasaws joined with the Confederacy as soon as 
called upon, the other tribes had factions which sought to remain 
neutral or sided with the Union.26 For example, the leader of the 
Creeks, Opothleyahola, encouraged neutrality.27 When it was clear 
his tribe would side with the Confederacy, he took a large group of 
pro-Union Creeks north to Kansas, where they were attacked by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Dekker, supra note 6. 
19 Reese, supra note 5; see also ABEL, supra note 11. 
20 BAILEY, supra note 5, at 23. 
21 Id. 
22 Reese, supra note 5. 
23 This paper uses “Creek” or “Creek Nation” to refer to the Muscogee (Creek) 
Nation, or the Mvskoke Nation. For a discussion on the origin and proper 
linguistic use of the tribe’s name, see SARAH DEER AND CECILIA KNAPP, 
Muscogee Constitutional Jurisprudence: Vhakv Em Pvtakv (The Carpet Under 
the Law), 49 TULSA L. REV. 125, 125 n.2 (2013-2014). 
24 BAILEY, supra note 5, at 22. 
25 KATJA, supra note 10, at 95. 
26 BAILEY, supra note 5, at 24. 
27 Id. at 25. 
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Confederate army.28 The northern faction suffered staggering losses 
and terrible conditions as they had to return to Indian Territory in 
the middle of the winter.29  
Chief John Ross of the Cherokees also preferred to remain 
neutral, and the full-blooded Cherokee faction30 preferred to side 
with the Union.31 Adding to the tribes’ difficulty in remaining 
neutral or siding with the Union, the Confederacy and Confederacy 
sympathizers held positions in much of the Southern 
Superintendency of Indian Affairs (the primary federal 
representative in Indian Territory), and these Southern sympathizers 
controlled the information that went to the tribes, sending much anti-
Union propaganda to them.32 Eventually, the Confederacy lost the 
battle for Indian Territory at the Battle of Honey Springs.33 The Five 
Civilized Tribes suffered greatly during the war, losing much of 
their agriculture, cattle, and people.34 The tribes did not recover 
from these losses after the war.  
The United States Government’s policy towards the tribes 
during the post-Civil War Reconstruction Era has been heavily 
criticized as its attempt to attain justice at the sole expense of a 
displaced, impoverished, and helpless people.35 To ensure that the 
Freedmen were given equal rights and to begin assimilating the 
tribes and Freedmen into the greater picture of a unified federal 
government, the United States sent General Sanborn to Indian 
Territory in October of 1865.36 General Sanborn’s direct task was to 
observe the Five Civilized Tribes’ treatment of the Freedmen and to 
report back to the Secretary of the Interior.37 His instructions were 
to refrain from intervention if the tribes were treating the Freedmen 
well and to intervene immediately if it was clear that the tribes were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Each of the Five Civilized Tribes had “full-blood” factions, who retained 
more of the tribes’ culture, and “mixed-blood,” who adopted more of the white 
culture. The mixed-blood factions more frequently owned slaves. See Id. at 22. 
31 LITTLEFIELD, supra note 16, at 10. 
32 Id. 
33 BAILEY, supra note 5, at 28. 
34 Id. at 28–29, 30. 
35 See generally ABEL, supra note 11, at 290-92; see also LITTLEFIELD, supra 
note 27, at 15. 
36 ABEL, supra note 11, at 275 (quoting Office of Indian Affairs, Circular no. I, 
in FREEDMEN FILES (1866)). 
37 Id. 
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abusing or denying rights to the Freedmen.38 Sanborn saw no 
problem incorporating the Freedmen of the Creeks and Seminoles 
into those tribes, which would have welcomed such an 
incorporation; however, he thought that the Cherokees would be 
more resistant.39 Sanborn informed the tribes that the Freedmen 
must be paid for their work and that contracts with the Freedmen 
featuring terms in excess of one month must be in writing.40 
Additionally, he communicated that the government would not 
tolerate prejudices against the Freedmen.41 Within other reports, 
Sanborn noted the Freedmen’s adoption of the Indian practice of 
polygamy, which he informed the Indians and Freedmen would no 
longer be tolerated as it was against Anglo-American values.42 After 
reporting to the Secretary of the Interior three times, Sanborn left 
Indian Territory.43 
On April 26, 1906, after nearly forty years of the Department 
of the Interior (now in charge of Indian affairs) attempting to adopt 
General Sanborn’s prohibitions and incorporate tribes and 
Freedmen into white society, members of each of the Five Civilized 
Tribes signed the Dawes Rolls, named after Senator Henry L. 
Dawes, founder of the Dawes Commission, the congressional 
commission in charge of allotting Indian lands in Oklahoma to 
individual tribal members in the early 1900s.44 These rolls were 
federal records used to keep track of members and to distribute 
federal benefits.45 For the Five Civilized Tribes, the rolls were 
divided into citizen by blood rolls and Freedmen rolls, with the 
racially Indian members signing the former and the Freedmen 
signing the latter.46  
What follows is a more in-depth examination of how the 
current membership requirements of each of the Five Civilized 
Tribes affect the Freedmen, which will help determine how the 
Rogers test will be applied to them. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Id. (quoting Office of Indian Affairs, Circular no. I, in FREEDMEN FILES 
(1866)); LITTLEFIELD, supra note 27, at 18-19. 
39 ABEL, supra note 11, at 297. 
40 LITTLEFIELD, supra note 16, at 20. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 23. 
44 COHEN, supra note 9, at 290. 
45 Id. at 290, 296-97. 
46 Id. 
	   201 
B. Cherokee Nation v. Nash 
On August 30, 2017, the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia determined that the descendants of the 
Cherokee Freedmen are entitled to the same citizenship rights as all 
members of the Cherokee Nation.47 The case analyzed the following 
issues: whether a treaty entered into between the United States and 
the Cherokee Nation in 1866 offered citizenship rights to the 
Freedmen, and if so, whether the descendants of the Freedmen are 
entitled to the rights of citizenship to which their ancestors, who are 
identified on the Final Roll of Cherokee Freedmen, were entitled.48 
 After reviewing the history of the 1866 Treaty (Treaty), the 
court turned its analysis to the meaning of the relevant language in 
Article 9 of the Treaty, which guaranteed that “all freedmen who 
have been liberated by voluntary act of their former owners or by 
law, as well as all free colored persons who were in the country at 
the commencement of the rebellion, and are now residents therein, 
or who may return within six months, and their descendants, shall 
have all the rights of native Cherokees.”49 First, the court asked what 
“all” means from the Treaty.50 It concluded that “all the rights of 
native Cherokees” means the entirety of those rights “without 
limitations.”51 Next, the court analyzed what “rights” means.52 It 
concluded that “rights of native Cherokees” means citizenship rights 
identical to those of native Cherokees.53 This grant of citizenship 
rights was not self-executing, for the Treaty guarantees rights that 
are only fully defined within the Cherokee Nation Constitution.54 
Because the constitution of the Cherokee Nation granted citizenship 
to its native citizens, it also granted citizenship to the Freedmen by 
implication of the Treaty.55 
 Turning to the second issue, the court determined that all 
descendants of the Freedmen, as determined by the Final Roll of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Cherokee Nation, 267 F. Supp. 3d 86 at 140. 
48 Id. at 114. 
49 Id. (quoting Treaty with the Cherokees, 1866, U.S.—Cherokee Nation of 
Indians, art. 9, July 19, 1866, 14 Stat. 799). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 117. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 122. 
54 Id. 
55 Cherokee Nation, 267 F. Supp. 3d 86 at 125. 
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Cherokee Freedmen, were entitled to citizenship rights.56 In its 
analysis, the court interpreted the meaning of the Five Tribes Act of 
1906, which gave the President of the United States the right to 
choose each of the Five Civilized Tribe’s principal chiefs, removed 
tribal taxes, and required presidential approval of tribal legislation 
and contracts for tribal property.57 The Cherokee Nation argued that 
the Five Tribes Act of 1906 amended the Treaty so that only 
Freedmen and their descendants “who were bona-fide residents of 
the Cherokee Nation by February 11, 1867” were entitled to 
citizenship rights.58 The court concluded that the purposes of the 
Five Tribes Act were allotment and dissolution, not to limit or 
amend Article 9 of the Treaty.59 The court also held that there is 
nothing in the legislative history of the Five Tribes Act which would 
indicate that Congress intended to amend Article 9 of the Treaty.60 
Finally, the Court rejected the Cherokee Nation’s argument that 
certain federal court cases limited the number of Freedmen entitled 
to citizenship rights, holding, inter alia, that Article 9 of the Treaty 
had never been altered.61 In summary, the court determined that all 
descendants of the Freedmen whose names appear on the Final Roll 
of Cherokee Freedmen are entitled to the same citizenship rights as 
native Cherokees.62 
Currently, in order to be eligible for citizenship, a Freedman 
“must be able to provide documents that connect [him or her] to an 
enrolled lineal ancestor, who is listed on the . . . FINAL ROLLS OF 
CITIZENS AND FREEDMEN OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED 
TRIBES, Cherokee Nation with a blood degree.”63  
As an important note leading into the next section, proving 
ancestry by reference to Freedmen rolls proves nothing more than 
an ancestral tie to a Freedman; it does not prove the biological tie 
required by the Rogers test used to determine criminal jurisdiction. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Id. at 132. 
57 Act of Apr. 26, 1906, §§ 6, 11, and 28, 34 Stat. 137. See also COHEN, supra 
note 9, at 295. 
58 Cherokee Nation, 267 F. Supp. 3d 86 at 132. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 140. 
62 Id. 
63 Cherokee Nation, Cherokee Nation Tribal Registration, 
https://www.cherokee.org/Portals/0/Documents/2012/8/31660Application_Instr
uctions.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2018) [https://perma.cc/EV8Z-LNBG]. 
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III. CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
 
Criminal jurisdiction in Indian country is determined by the 
location of the crime and the identities of the victim and offender 
(Indian status).64 The two primary federal statutes which use these 
two elements to grant jurisdiction to the federal courts are the Indian 
Country Crimes Act (ICCA), for minor crimes and major crimes 
where the offender is non-Indian,65 and the Major Crimes Act 
(MCA), for major crimes where the offender is Indian.66 Any crime 
committed by an Indian in Indian country that is not adjudicated in 
federal court is adjudicated in tribal court, which includes minor 
crimes committed by one Indian against another Indian, as the ICCA 
only applies to inter-racial crimes involving an Indian and a non-
Indian.67 State jurisdiction applies in Indian country when both the 
offender and victim are non-Indians, or probably when the offender 
is non-Indian and there is no victim.68 
An illustration is helpful. James is a biological member of 
the Cherokee Nation and Lisa is a non-Indian. Both live in 
Oklahoma. If James steals Lisa’s lawnmower on an Indian allotment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Federal criminal jurisdictional statutes for Indian lands have long been 
described with reference to “Indian country.” Clinton, supra. note 2, at 507. The 
language of the federal criminal jurisdictional statutes “not only limits the 
application of federal Indian criminal jurisdiction to Indian country; it also 
draws significant jurisdictional distinctions based on whether the victim or the 
accused is Indian.” Id. at 513. 
65 18 U.S.C. § 1153. 
66 Federal courts have jurisdiction over major crimes committed by an Indian in 
Indian country and minor crimes where either the victim or the offender (not 
both) is Indian. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152–53 (2012). 18 U.S.C. § 1153, or the ICCA, 
has an “inter-racial” exception, whereby federal courts cannot adjudicate crimes 
committed by an Indian against another Indian. See COHEN, supra note 9, at 
741. For minor crimes committed in Indian country where both the offender and 
victim are Indians, tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. United States v. 
Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004); 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1990). 
67 Lara, 541 U.S. at 200; 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2). If the crime is victimless, two 
approaches are taken—one essentially saying there is no Indian victim and thus, 
federal jurisdiction and the other saying that there is an Indian victim and thus, 
tribal jurisdiction. United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 605 (1916); See also 
Margo S. Brownell, Note, Who Is an Indian? Searching for an Answer to the 
Question at the Core of Federal Indian Law, 34 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 275, 284 
(2000/2001) (citing 137 Cong. Rec. 23,673 (1991), in which Senator Daniel K. 
Inouye explains the policy behind having one definition for “Indian” so that it 
will apply to federal and tribal jurisdiction.) For the inter-racial exception, see 
18 U.S.C. § 1153. 
68 United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881) (This rule came to be 
known as the “McBratney rule”). 
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held in trust for the Cherokee Nation, which is Indian country as 
defined by statute, James could be prosecuted in federal court or 
Cherokee tribal court because he is an Indian (he is a member of a 
federally recognized tribe and has a biological tie to a tribe), and he 
committed a minor crime against a non-Indian in Indian country. If 
James were non-Indian, he would be prosecuted in state court. And 
if James were Indian and Lisa was also Indian, James would be tried 
in Cherokee tribal court. If James committed murder, he could be 
prosecuted in federal or tribal court; however, due to statutory 
limitations on tribal court sentencing,69 James would probably be 
prosecuted in federal court. Beyond the location of the crime, 
James’s and Lisa’s Indian status is the primary variable in this 
hypothetical. Therefore, it is easiest to keep in mind two concepts 
when discussing criminal jurisdiction over Indians: Indian country 
and Indian status. This paper takes each in turn. 
 
A. Indian Country 
 Indian country consists of Indian reservations, dependent 
Indian communities, and Indian allotments to which Indian title has 
never been extinguished.70 Since the onset of the allotment period, 
much of Indian country in Oklahoma has transitioned from 
reservation lands to allotments, which are held in trust for tribal 
members or the tribe.71 The holding in Murphy stands to make one 
of the two largest metropolitan areas in the state a reservation and, 
thereby, expand Indian country immensely.72 But regardless of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(D) (2010). 
70 18 U.S.C. § 1151; see also COHEN, supra note 9, at 741. Allotments are 
individual plots of land on a reservation, usually 160 acres each, designated to 
tribal members after Congress decided to assimilate the Indians into white 
society at the turn of the 20th century. 
71 See generally Royster, supra note 3; COHEN, supra note 9, at 294-98;  
DAVID GRANN, KILLERS OF THE FLOWER MOON: THE OSAGE 
MURDERS AND THE BIRTH OF THE 
FBI, CH. 19 (2017); see generally Philip H. Tinker, Is Oklahoma Still Indian 
Country – Justifiable Expectations and Reservation Disestablishment in Murphy 
v. Sirmons and Osage Nation v. Irby, 9 DARTMOUTH L.J. (2011). 
72 875 F.3d 896, 918 (10th Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Feb. 7, 2018) 
(No. 17-1107) (holding that Congress never disestablished or diminished the 
Creek Reservation, which includes most of Tulsa, Oklahoma). As stated at the 
beginning of this paper, Murphy is currently on appeal to the United States 
Supreme Court. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 23-26, Murphy v. Royal, 
875 F.3d 896 (No. 17-1107). If the Supreme Court grants certiorari review, it 
will either affirm the Tenth Circuit’s holding that the Creek reservation is still 
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holding in Murphy, Indian country in Oklahoma is substantial. 
When the Dawes Commission initially allotted Indian tribal lands to 
individual members, that land was held in trust by the federal 
government.73 Some of these allotments were converted to lands 
held in fee, which were subsequently sold to non-Indians.74 
However, much of the allotted lands are still held in trust, making 
them a significant part of Indian country in Oklahoma.75 
1. Expanding Indian Country in Oklahoma: Murphy v. Royal 
 
On August 8, 2017, a Tenth Circuit panel reversed a State of 
Oklahoma murder conviction of Patrick Murphy and ruled that 
Congress has never disestablished or diminished the Creek 
reservation.76 Murphy was convicted in 2002 in state court for 
murdering George Jacobs in McIntosh County, near Henryetta, 
Oklahoma.77 After Murphy’s conviction, he sought direct appeal 
and the judgment was affirmed.78 Murphy then sought post-
conviction relief in 2004 with the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals (OCCA), this time challenging the State’s jurisdiction over 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
intact or reverse the holding. If it affirms or denies cert., the mandate of the 
Tenth Circuit will issue and the Creek reservation boundaries will be effectively 
intact. Regardless of whether Murphy is upheld, Indian country will continue to 
exist in Oklahoma in the form of trust lands to which Indian title has never been 
extinguished, and informal reservations. See Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. at 123. 
This would be a much smaller area of lands, but still enough to where the Indian 
status of the Freedmen members will eventually need to be examined by courts. 
73 COHEN, supra note 9, at 288-94. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Murphy v. Royal, 866 F.3d 1164, 1173 (10th Cir. 2017). The terms 
“disestablish” and “diminish” refer to Congress’s extinguishment or reduction of 
Indian reservations. See Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984) (“[O]nly 
Congress can divest a reservation of its land and diminish its boundaries.”); 
Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (holding that Congress may abrogate a treaty at 
will, even if the Indians never understood the treaty due to a deceptive 
translation). Once the mandate issues, the 1866 boundaries of the Creek 
reservation will be reinstated, including parts of Tulsa, Seminole, Mayes, and 
Rogers counties, as well as McIntosh, Okfuskee, Hughes, Wagoner, Okmulgee, 
and Creek counties. Curtis Killman, Experts: Court ruling overturning Native 
American man’s murder conviction, death penalty could have huge implications, 
TULSA WORLD (August 8, 2017), 
http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/courts/experts-court-ruling-overturning-
native-american-man-s-murder-conviction/article_dd761b1d-2d9c-5542-8a50-
771f2f92de85.html [https://perma.cc/CZ9W-M9R9]. 
77 Murphy, 866 F.3d at 1173. 
78 Id. at 906. 
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him.79 If the Creek reservation was considered intact at the time, 
Murphy’s crime was committed in Indian country and the state 
lacked jurisdiction when it prosecuted him, for both parties accepted 
the fact that Murphy was for all intents and purposes an Indian.80 
The OCCA held that the state had jurisdiction over Murphy because 
his crime was not committed in Indian country.81 Murphy then 
sought post-conviction habeas relief in federal court, again 
challenging the state’s jurisdiction.82 The U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Oklahoma denied habeas relief. Murphy 
appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ultimately 
reversed this decision, holding that the state lacked jurisdiction over 
Murphy because his crime was committed on the Creek 
reservation.83 The primary issue the Tenth Circuit discussed was 
whether Congress disestablished or diminished the Creek 
reservation, meaning whether they reduced its borders or eliminated 
them altogether.84 The court focused on this issue because 
diminishment of the Creek reservation could have affected the 
whether or not the scene of the crime was Indian country, an 
essential element in deciding jurisdiction.  
 The Tenth Circuit noted that whether the Creek Reservation 
had been disestablished or diminished was a matter of unsettled 
law.85 The Tenth Circuit applied the test derived from the 1984 
Supreme Court’s decision, Solem v. Bartlett for determining 
whether Congress diminished or disestablished an Indian 
reservation.86 
Prior to discussing Solem, it is important to note why the 
Tenth Circuit chose that particular disestablishment or 
diminishment case, for it was not the diminishment case utilized by 
OCCA.87 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
requires that the state court’s ruling be against clearly establish law. 
Therefore, in order to overturn Murphy’s conviction and find that 
the state lack jurisdiction, the court had to show that OCCA erred 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 1173. 
83 Id. at 1173–78. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 1230. 
86 Solem, 465 U.S. 463 (1984). 
87 Murphy, 866 F.3d at 926-27. 
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by ignoring clearly established law.88 The Tenth Circuit held that 
OCCA erred by not applying the caselaw previously established by 
the Supreme Court in Solem, which had been in effect for over 
twenty years and was consistently applied by both the Supreme 
Court and federal appellate courts.89 
 Solem was a habeas case brought by a member of the 
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe who was convicted of attempted rape 
by a state court in South Dakota.90 Like the defendant in Murphy, 
the defendant in Solem argued that the state court decision should be 
overturned because the state court lacked jurisdiction under the 
MCA.91 The Supreme Court applied a three-factor test to determine 
whether Congress had disestablished or diminished the Cheyenne 
River Sioux Reservation in South Dakota.92 The Court looked at the 
following:  (1) the specific statutory language to determine whether 
Congress expressly intended to diminish or disestablish the 
reservation, (2) the “events surrounding the passage” of the statute 
to determine implicit intent, and (3) the “events that occurred after 
the passage” of the statute to determine whether congressional 
hearings and reactions to the statutes or treaties indicated an intent 
to diminish or disestablish the reservation.93  
The Tenth Circuit noted in Murphy that “events that 
occurred after the passage” of the statute should be given less weight 
if the court cannot find that Congress explicitly or implicitly 
intended to dissolve or diminish a reservation by treaty or statutory 
enactment.94 
 In Murphy, the State of Oklahoma presented the language of 
eight statutes governing the relationship between the United States 
and the Creek Nation in an attempt to demonstrate that Congress 
expressly intended to diminish or disestablish the Creek 
Reservation.95 After analyzing these statutes, the Tenth Circuit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 921-22 (citing South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 333, 
344 (1998); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 410-11; Shawnee Tribe v. United 
States, 423 F.3d 1204, 1221 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Webb, 219 F.3d 
1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) and other courts of appeals and district courts 
utilizing Solem). 
90 Solem, 465 U.S. at 465. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 470-80. 
93 Id. 
94 Murphy, 866 F.3d at 1232-33. 
95 Id. at 1206-15. 
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concluded that there was no language explicitly indicating that 
Congress intended to disestablish or diminish the Creek 
reservation.96 For example, the State cited to the Curtis Act,97 
arguing that the Act explicitly diminished the Creek Reservation; 
however, the court held that the Act merely eliminated tribal courts 
on the reservation and did not address the reservation borders.98 In 
sum, the court found that the statutory language indicated that the 
reservation borders were still in existence because Congress did not 
expressly intend to diminish the reservation.99 
 Next, the Tenth Circuit looked for “contemporary historical 
evidence” that demonstrated by implication that Congress intended 
to disestablish or diminish the Creek Reservation.100 In this context, 
effectively demonstrating the implied intent of Congress “requires 
‘unambiguous evidence’ that ‘unequivocally reveals’ congressional 
intent” to disestablish or diminish the reservation.101 Here, the State 
produced evidence that Congress considered the eventual demise of 
the Creek Nation’s government.102 However, the Tenth Circuit 
concluded that the State failed to produce evidence that Congress 
specifically intended to diminish or disestablish the reservation.103 
Despite Congress’s consideration of the eventual demise of the 
Creek Nation’s government, the Creek Nation’s government was 
never terminated.104 And, even if the Creek Nation’s government 
had been terminated, the reservation could still be intact.105 
 Finally, after concluding that contemporary historical 
evidence did not demonstrate the implied intent of Congress, the 
court looked to “later history.”106 The Tenth Circuit acknowledged 
that there is some confusion amongst federal courts about whether 
the Creek Reservation was disestablished.107 However, such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Id. at 1215. 
97 30 Stat. 495 (June 28, 1898). 
98 Murphy, 866 F.3d at 1208. 
99 Id. at 1218. 
100 Id. at 1220. 
101 Id. (quoting Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1076, 1080–81 (2016)). 
102 Id. at 1221–24. 
103 Murphy, 866 F.3d at 1221–24 
104 Id. at 1223–24 (emphasis added). 
105 Id. at 1223–24. 
106 Id. at 1226. 
107 See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 51 Ct. Cl. 125, 127 (1916), aff’d, 248 U.S. 
354 (1919) (The Federal Court of Claims erroneously remarked, according to 
the Supreme Court, that the “Creek Nation of Indians kept up their tribal 
organization . . . until the year 1906, at which date the tribal government was 
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confusion is not evidence of a congressional intent to disestablish or 
diminish the Creek Reservation.108 Here, the court applied the 
Indian canons of construction.109 While their application is not 
mandatory, the canons encourage federal courts to interpret 
ambiguities or uncertainties in favor of the tribes.110 Applying this 
concept, the courts must have an express indication that Congress 
intended to disestablish or diminish the Creek reservation.111 While 
the Tenth Circuit recognized that there may be some confusion, it 
concluded that evidence of the continuation of the Creek 
Reservation outweighed any evidence of its disestablishment or 
diminishment.112 Taking the Solem factors into consideration, the 
Tenth Circuit overturned the lower court’s decision and held that the 
Creek Reservation is still intact.113 
 If the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Murphy v. Royal is not 
overruled by the Supreme Court,114 the 1866 borders of the Creek 
Reservation will continue to be recognized (these were the post-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
terminated by the general provision of [the Original Allotment Agreement].”); 
but see Board of Com’rs of Creek County v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 718 (1943) 
(The Supreme Court, after Turner, concluded that the Creek Nation “still 
exists.”). 
108 Murphy, 866 F.3d at 1231. 
109 See generally COHEN, supra note 9, at 113–28. 
110 See generally COHEN, supra note 9, at 113–28. 
111 See generally ROBERT T. ANDERSON, BETHANY BERGER, SARAH KRAKOFF, 
& PHILIP P. FRICKEY, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 170-
72 (3d ed. 2015); see also Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 397 U.S. 
620, 631 (1970) (Treaties “must be interpreted as [the tribes] would have 
understood them, and any doubtful expressions in them should be resolved in 
the Indians’ favor.”). 
112 Murphy, 866 F.3d at 1232-33. In another interesting part of the Murphy case, 
the Tenth Circuit recognized that this decision impacts Tulsa—a metropolitan 
area—and that many of the people residing on the Creek reservation are not in 
fact members of the reservation or even Indians (“only 5.3%” of people living in 
Tulsa are Indian). Id. at 1232. This, the Tenth Circuit notes, is no indication that 
the reservation has been diminished or disestablished. Id. Interestingly, the 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari argues that the population factor in Tulsa should 
cause the Supreme Court to go the other way with its analysis—that the 
reservation was disestablished. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15-18, Murphy 
v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896 (No. 17-1107). 
113 Id. at 1233. 
114 The Tenth Circuit denied to rehear Murphy en banc. However, Chief Judge 
Tymkovich wrote separately, concurring with the results, and recommending 
that Murphy would be a good case for Supreme Court review. See Murphy, 866 
F.3d, Nos. 07-7068 at 1-4 (Tymkovich, C.J. concurring). On February 6, 2018, 
the State of Oklahoma petitioned the United States Supreme Court for writ of 
certiorari to review the Tenth Circuit’s holding. See Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at 23-26, Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896 (No. 17-1107). 
	   210 
Civil War borders which represented the last explicit congressional 
diminishment of the Creek reservation).115 The reservation will 
consist of all or part of eleven counties in Northeastern Oklahoma, 
including most of Tulsa County.116 This area includes over 4,600 
square miles inhabited by over 750,000 people (see n.178 for an 
illustration).117 Because Indian country in Oklahoma will be 
expanded to include a major metropolitan area, which is home to 
many of the Freedmen that became members of the Cherokee Nation 
after the D.C. Circuit Court decided Nash,118 it is more likely that a 
Freedmen member will be either a victim or perpetrator of a crime 
committed in Indian country. 
 Returning briefly to our hypothetical, assume now that 
James, a member of the Cherokee Nation, and Lisa both live in 
Tulsa, Oklahoma, much of which will be part of the Creek 
reservation if the Murphy mandate issues. It is much more likely that 
James’s crime of stealing Lisa’s lawnmower, were it to occur after 
the issuance of that mandate, would be committed in Indian country 
and that James would be prosecuted in federal court or tribal court. 
Although Cherokee trust land, where the crime was committed in 
the original hypothetical, is prevalent in Northeastern Oklahoma, it 
is not nearly as prevalent as it will be if the Murphy mandate issues. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Id. at 1232. 
116 Muscogee (Creek) Nation Geospatial Department, Muscogee (Creek) Nation 
Maps, http://mcngis.com/index.php/maps [https://perma.cc/H2J9-F2S2]. 
117 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16, Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896 (No. 17-
1107). 
 
(copied from Id.) The United States filed an amicus curiae brief estimating the 
area affected by Murphy at over 3 million acres and the total population at 
around 950,000 people. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 1, 21, Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896 (No. 17-1107). 
118 See Part II.B.v. supra. 
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2. Indian Status 
 
This brings us to the second part of criminal jurisdiction in 
Indian country—Indian status. The answer to how federal, state, and 
tribal courts determine Indian status lies in federal common law. The 
method for determining whether or not a party possesses Indian 
status for the purposes of determining criminal jurisdiction has been 
developed by courts applying what has become known as the Rogers 
test. In this section, this article. This section discusses the Rogers 
case, and that discussion is followed by an analysis of how lower 
courts have applied the test developed in that case. These 
applications will provide evidence that federal courts will not retain 
jurisdiction over the Freedmen. 
Congress has not specifically defined “Indian” for purposes 
of interpreting the ICCA.119 In this context, the current test for 
Indian status is derived from United States v. Rogers, which was 
decided in 1846, and involves two parts.120 First, a court must 
determine if the person has any Indian blood.121 This is a question 
of fact and can be proven by DNA evidence,122 testimony from 
family members, or recorded family genealogy (such as a tribal roll, 
or the Dawes Rolls if the tribe is in Oklahoma).123 Next, the court 
must determine whether the person is a recognized Indian, which the 
Supreme Court later defined in United States v. Antelope as being 
recognized by membership or affiliation with a federally-recognized 
tribe.124 For the second part of the Rogers test, it is an issue of fact 
whether the person is a member of a federally-recognized tribe and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 COHEN, supra note 9, at 746. Cohen points out that “Congress has stated only 
that ‘Indian’ means any person who would be subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States as an Indian under the [Major Crimes Act].” 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) 
(1990). This provision was designed to make clear that the term “Indian” 
encompasses both members and nonmembers of a tribe exercising criminal 
jurisdiction. It does not define the term, however, incorporating instead the 
judicial glosses on the term in cases adjudicated under the Major Crimes Act.”  
Id. at n.49. 
120 Id. citing Rogers, 45 U.S. 567; Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1938). 
121 Rogers, 45 U.S. at 573; see generally Sharon O’Brien, Tribes and Indians: 
With Whom Does the United States Maintain a Relationship?, 66 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1461, 1463 (1991) (explaining how the government uses race to 
determine Indian status). 
122 Proving a genetic tie to a racial Indian who can demonstrate race through an 
ancestral tie or membership card. 
123 See, e.g., Torres, 733 F.2d at 455. 
124 COHEN, supra note 9, at 746 citing Antelope, 430 U.S. 641. 
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a court may instruct a jury to look at the following factors “in 
declining order of importance”: “1) enrollment in a tribe; 2) 
government recognition formally and informally through providing 
the person assistance reserved only to Indians; 3) enjoying benefits 
of tribal affiliation; and 4) social recognition as an Indian through 
living on a reservation and participating in Indian social life.”125 
The issue before the Court in Rogers was whether a white 
man who was adopted by the Cherokee Nation but having no blood 
relations could be considered Indian within the meaning of the 
ICCA—which only applies to crimes committed by or against an 
Indian where a non-Indian was the other party.126 The Court held 
that neither the white defendant nor the white victim qualified as 
Indian.127 The Court reasoned that one must have a racial tie to the 
tribe to be considered Indian.128 The Court further defined “racial 
tie” as follows: 
 
[T]he exception is confined to those who by the usages and 
customs of the Indians are regarded as belonging to their race. It 
does not speak of members of a tribe, but of the race generally, of 
the family of Indians; and it intended to leave them both, as regarded 
their own tribe, and other tribes also, to be governed by Indian 
usages and customs.129 
Although the Rogers Court had not developed a coherent test 
for determining Indian status, it is clear that the races of the offender 
and the victim were important to the Court. In applying the Rogers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 763 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting St. 
Cloud, 702 F.Supp. at 1461). The reason courts look at factors beyond mere 
membership is that not all Indians are members of their tribes. The main reason 
for this is—especially in Oklahoma—is that an Indian’s ancestors refused or 
were not given the opportunity to sign the membership rolls, known as the 
Dawes Rolls. A person might have refused to sign the rolls because of the 
negative stigma associated with being Indian or because of the poor treatment 
Indians were given by the government at the time when the rolls were signed. 
For a discussion of how state courts treat the second prong of the Rogers test, 
see Katharine C. Oakley, Defining Indian Status for the Purpose of Federal 
Criminal Jurisdiction, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 177, 185 (2010-2011) (noting that 
state courts apply different tests, such as “significant” Indian blood). 
126 Rogers, 45 U.S. at 572–73; see Part III supra (The ICCA does not apply to 
“inter-racial” crimes; that is, a crime where both the offender and victim are 
Indian or non-Indian). 
127 Id. at 573. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
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test, the Tenth Circuit has held that a person must meet both 
prongs—the racial component and the membership component.130 
The Ninth Circuit has held that the first prong of the Rogers test 
“requires ancestry living in America before the Europeans 
arrived.”131 However, because “this fact is obviously rarely provable 
as such . . . the general requirement is only of ‘some’ blood [as 
proven by] evidence of a parent, grandparent, or great-grandparent 
who is clearly identified as an Indian . . .”132 As a matter of practice, 
a court looks to the quantum of Indian blood an individual possesses, 
and if it is “some” blood, the individual passes the first prong of the 
Rogers test.133 
In applying the first prong of the Rogers test, federal courts 
require the party seeking to establish Indian status to proffer 
evidence of the relevant person’s Indian blood quantum.134 Courts 
allow the admittance of a party’s tribal roll, which is usually in the 
form of a certificate of enrollment indicating that the party possesses 
a certain quantum of Indian blood in order to satisfy the first 
prong.135 As “[t]he BIA has explained, . . . a certificate of degree of 
Indian blood ‘certifies that an individual possesses a specified 
degree of Indian blood of a federally recognized Indian tribe.’”136 
The tribe that issued such a certificate need not be the same tribe 
referred to when applying the second prong of the test nor does that 
tribe need to be federally recognized.137 Additionally, when a tribe 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Id. 
131 United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2005). 
132 Id.; see also United States v. Maggi, 598 F.3d 1073, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010) 
overruled by 792 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2015). 
133 See, e.g., Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1223–24 (one-eighth Indian blood quantum was 
sufficient); see also United States v. Loera, 952 F.Supp.2d 862 (Dist. Ct. Ariz. 
2013) (3/16ths Indian blood quantum is sufficient to satisfy the first-prong); St. 
Cloud, 703 F.Supp. at 1460 (15/32s Yankton Sioux is sufficient for “some” 
Indian blood). 
134 Prentiss, 273 F.3d at 1280–83 (The government failed to prove Indian status 
where it failed to produce any evidence of “some” Indian blood). 
135 See, e.g., Torres, 733 F.2d at 455 (“[T]he Government introduced certificates 
of tribal enrollment, certifying that appellants . . . were each listed on the 
Menominee Tribal Roll [one appellant was 25/64 degree Menominee Indian 
blood and the other was 11/32 degree Menominee Indian blood].”) 
136 United States v. Rainbow, 813 F.3d 1097, 1103 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting 
Certificate of Degree of Indian or Alaska Native Blood, 65 Fed. Reg. 20775-01 
(proposed Apr. 18, 2000)). 
137 United States v. Zepeda, 792 F.3d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 2015); see also St. 
Cloud, 702 F.Supp. at 1460–61 (“Even assuming away St. Cloud’s Ponca 
heritage, St. Cloud’s 15/32 of Yankton Sioux blood is sufficient to satisfy the 
first requirement of having a degree of Indian blood.”). 
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requires a certain quantum of Indian blood as a prerequisite for 
membership, testimony that a party is a member of the tribe is 
sufficient to establish that the person is Indian.138 
Now that this paper has discussed the history of the 
Freedmen, including their placement on separate rolls from racially 
Indian members, and criminal jurisdiction, which involves a fact 
intensive test requiring a biological tie to the tribe, we are ready to 
address the thesis of this article. 
 
IV. THE FREEDMAN OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES OF OKLAHOMA 
ARE MEMBERS, BUT NOT INDIANS:  
FUTURE IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 
 
The Freedmen of the Five Civilized Tribes are tribal 
members, but they are not racially Indian. Therefore, the Freedmen 
are not entitled to the protections of the federal criminal jurisdiction 
statutes. Because the Freedmen are excluded from these statutes 
solely on the basis of their race, the current definition of Indian 
status as it is applied to the Freedmen violates the Equal Protection 
Clause. Classifying the Freedmen as non-Indians also violates 
federal policy towards the tribes, which is a policy of tribal self-
determination. Requiring Indians to demonstrate blood quantum 
does not stand to benefit the tribes, many of which have blood 
quantum requirements for membership. If the first prong of the 
Rogers test were removed, Indians could prove a racial tie to their 
tribe by proving membership, and the Freedmen would simply be 
classified as Indians. 
A. The Freedmen Members of the Five Civilized Tribes of 
Oklahoma are not Indians 
 
In the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court twice 
addressed the Indian status of the Freedmen. These cases have never 
been overturned. Therefore, their application holds true today; 
despite being members of federally recognized tribes, the Freedmen 
of the Five Civilized Tribes of Oklahoma are not Indians. 
1.   Alberty v. United States and the Notion that the 
Freedmen Are Not Indians.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 See Rainbow, 813 F.3d at 1105. 
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In Alberty v. United States, which the Supreme Court 
decided in 1896, the Court concluded that a Freedmen member of 
the Cherokee Nation was not an Indian.139 Because this case was 
decided over a century ago under different circumstances, some 
background information is helpful. Prior to 1907, when present day 
Oklahoma was Indian Territory, the United States Supreme Court 
decided a number of cases in which the issue of whether the offender 
or victim was Indian was analyzed for purposes of deciding federal 
criminal jurisdiction.140 At the time, if a crime was committed in 
Indian Territory, there were only two options for prosecuting the 
offender: The offender could be prosecuted in tribal court under the 
Act of May 2, 1890 (now repealed), or he or she could be prosecuted 
in federal court under the ICCA or the MCA.141 The Act of May 2, 
1890 provided exclusive jurisdiction, civil and criminal, to the 
Indian Nation in whose land the wrongful act occurred, assuming 
that both parties were Indian “by nativity or adoption.”142 “By 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 162 U.S. at 501. See Clinton, supra note 2, at n.60. In the footnote, Professor 
Clinton points out the anomaly of the 19th Century courts in determining that a 
non-racially Indian member was Indian for purposes of the protective federal 
criminal jurisdiction statutes. Id. He proposes that this would theoretically just 
apply to tribal jurisdiction, citing Nofire v. United States, 164 U.S. 657 (1897). 
Id. However, although he cites Alberty, he does not analyze that case in 
particular. The argument of this paper is that by applying Alberty, courts can 
rule that non-racially Indian members, like many of the Freedmen, are non-
Indians for purposes of the federal criminal jurisdiction statutes such as 18 
U.S.C. § 1152 and 18 U.S.C. § 1152. By following this application, courts 
would violate the Equal Protection Clause and federal policy towards the tribes. 
The solution to these pitfalls is to remove the first prong of the Rogers test 
whereby the Freedmen would be Indians and obtain federal criminal 
jurisdiction. 
140 Lucas, 163 U.S. at 617; Alberty, 162 U.S. at 501. The issue of who is or is not 
Indian for jurisdictional purposes had many different interpretations by lower 
courts at this time. For example, many courts applied the English common law 
presumption that a child born to a white father and Indian mother was white and 
not Indian, although the tribes would have mostly recognized the child as the 
ethnicity of the mother. For more on this, see Clinton, supra note 2, at 515 n.53; 
see also United States v. Hadley, 99 F. 437, 438 (C.C.D. Wash. 1900); but see 
United States v. Sanders, 27 F. Cas. 950, 951 (1847) (a child takes the 
ethnicity—Indian or non-Indian—of their mother without regard to quantum of 
blood). 
141 Lucas, 163 U.S. at 617; Alberty, 162 U.S. at 501; Rogers, 45 U.S. at 573; Ex 
parte Wilson, 140 U.S. 575 (1891); Pickett v. United States, 216 U.S. 456, 458 
(1910). The offense occurred prior to Oklahoma’s statehood but was not decided 
by the Supreme Court until 1910. Pickett, 216 U.S. at 458. Now, the state of 
Oklahoma is a third avenue for prosecution. Id. 
142 Lucas, 163 U.S. at 614-15 (citing the Act of May 2, 1890); see also Nofire, 
164 U.S. at 662 (A citizen by adoption is an Indian for jurisdictional purposes 
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nativity,” meant that the party maintained a biological tie to the tribe. 
“By adoption,”  in contrast, meant that the party was a member of 
the tribe but maintained no racial tie to the tribe; ICCA and MCA 
are substantially the same as they were in the late 1800s.143 
In Alberty, the Supreme Court determined that a Freedmen 
member of the Cherokee Nation was not an Indian for purposes of 
the Rogers test.144 A Cherokee Freedmen, who went by the names 
Burns and Alberty,145 was convicted and sentenced to death for the 
murder of Phil Duncan. Duncan was a non-Indian son of a Choctaw 
man and an African-American woman, which Alberty allegedly 
committed in the Cherokee Nation.146 At the time, the Choctaw 
Nation did not grant citizenship to the son or daughter of a Choctaw 
man and a non-Choctaw woman, although it did the reverse—it 
granted citizenship to the son or daughter of a Choctaw woman and 
a non-Choctaw man.147 On appeal, the Supreme Court first 
determined the jurisdictional basis for the claim being brought in 
federal court.148 The Court noted that, although Alberty was “not a 
native Indian, but a negro born in slavery, it was not disputed that 
he became a citizen of the Cherokee Nation, under the ninth article 
of the treaty of 1866.”149 However, “while this article of the treaty 
gave him the rights of a native Cherokee, it did not, standing alone, 
make him an Indian, within the meaning of [the Indian Country 
Crimes Act], or absolve him from responsibility to the criminal laws 
of the United States, as was held in U.S. v. Rogers.”150 
As to the victim’s status, the Court held that Duncan, “the 
illegitimate child of a Choctaw Indian [and] a colored woman, who 
was . . . a slave in the Cherokee Nation . . . must be treated as a negro 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and thus under the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribe in whose nation the crime 
occurs). 
143 Cf. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152, 1153 with Act Cong. June 30, 1834, § 25. 
144 Alberty, 162 U.S. at 501 (“For the purposes of jurisdiction, then, Alberty [a 
Freedmen citizen of the Cherokee Nation] must be treated as a member of the 
Cherokee Nation, but not an Indian; and Duncan as a colored citizen of the 
United States.”) (emphasis added). 
145 Id. at 499. 
146 Id. at 499–501. 
147 Id. 
148 Alberty, 162 U.S. at 500 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 500–01. 
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by birth, and not as a Choctaw Indian.”151 Duncan moved to the 
Cherokee Nation when he was about seventeen and married a 
Cherokee citizen.152 However, the Court could not determine from 
the Cherokee laws that marrying a Cherokee citizen made Duncan a 
Cherokee citizen.153 Therefore, it concluded that Duncan was not a 
Cherokee citizen but “a citizen of the United States.”154 The Court 
went on to discuss whether the victim to a murder was a “party” in 
the lawsuit, which would give the federal courts jurisdiction over 
this crime or whether the victim was not a party and thus, the 
Cherokee Nation would have jurisdiction over this crime.155 
However, for the purposes of this paper, it is important to note the 
holding that Alberty, a Freedmen member of the Cherokee Nation, 
“must be treated as a member of the Cherokee Nation, but not an 
Indian.”156 
2. Lucas v. United States: An African-American in Indian Country 
 
In the same year that Alberty was decided, the Supreme 
Court found error in a trial court’s jury instructions establishing a 
conclusive presumption that an African-American man found in the 
Choctaw Nation was not an Indian.157 The case was brought in 
federal court under the ICCA when a Choctaw Indian killed an 
African-American man residing in the Choctaw Nation.158 At the 
time, the Choctaw Nation had given citizenship rights to their 
Freedmen. Therefore, if the freedman victim was deemed an Indian 
“by adoption,” the Choctaw Nation would have exclusive 
jurisdiction over the case because the offender, a racially Indian 
member, was an Indian “by nativity” and the freedman would be an 
Indian “by adoption” under the statute.159 However, if the freedman 
was deemed a non-Indian and merely a citizen of the United States, 
the federal court would have exclusive jurisdiction under the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Id. at 501. According to Choctaw laws at the time, the son of a Choctaw man 
and a non-Choctaw woman was not a citizen of the Choctaw Nation. The other 
Five Civilized Tribes had similar laws. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 504. 
156 Id. at 501. 
157 Lucas, 163 U.S. at 617. 
158 Id. at 615. 
159 Id. at 613–14. 
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ICCA.160 The federal judge instructed the jury that “you are required 
to find that Kemp, the man killed [the freedman],. . . was a negro, 
and not an Indian. That means he was a citizen of the United States. 
That means that the [federal] court has jurisdiction of the case under 
the law.”161 The judge went on to explain, “it may be said that there 
are some people who are negroes who are adopted into that Nation, 
but that is the exception to the rule.”162 The Supreme Court found 
this presumption to be in error.163 In the Court’s view, the 
presumption should have been reversed— a presumption of 
membership (“by adoption”) should be given to an African-
American man residing in the Choctaw Nation.164 However, the 
Supreme Court did not go as far as creating that presumption.165 The 
Court merely held that it was error to presume that the freedman was 
not a member simply because he was African-American.166 
Although the act of May 2, 1890 has been repealed, the 
criminal jurisdiction statutes and the Rogers test have not changed 
since Alberty and Lucas. Thus, the holding from the cases would 
likely still be affirmed today. The Freedmen are Indians “by 
adoption” and thus, are not Indians under the Rogers test. 
 
3. Application of Roger Facts 
 
In addition to Alberty and Lucas applying to the Freedmen, 
the facts from Rogers also demonstrate that the Freedmen are non-
Indians. As discussed above, United States v. Rogers involved a 
white adopted member of the Cherokee Nation who killed another 
white man in Cherokee Territory.167 The offender was tried in 
federal court, and the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s 
ruling that the offender and victim were both non-Indian due to their 
lack of Indian blood.168 
Applying the holding in Rogers, a member of a tribe who is 
not racially Indian is not an Indian. In Rogers, neither the offender 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 Id. at 613. 
161 Id. at 615. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 616. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 618. 
167 Rogers, 45 U.S. at 572-73. 
168 Id. at 573. 
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nor the victim were considered Indian because both were white and 
only maintained membership ties to the Cherokee Nation.169 
Therefore, neither the MCA nor the ICCA applied.170 Similar to the 
parties in Rogers, many of the Freedmen either have no Indian blood 
or cannot prove that they have Indian blood because their ancestry 
was recorded on the Freedmen rolls rather than on the citizen by 
blood rolls. Thus, they fail the first prong of the Rogers test. While 
racially Indian members may use tribal membership documents to 
prove that they possess “some Indian blood” under the first 
requirement of Rogers, the Freedmen’s membership documents will 
only prove that they are descended from tribal members who signed 
the Freedmen rolls. In many cases, these documents include no 
proof of Indian blood upon which Freedmen could establish Indian 
status.171 
B. The Freedmen of the Five Civilized Tribes Should be Indians 
 
 Although they are not Indians under current law, the 
Freedmen of the Five Civilized Tribes should be classified as 
Indians. First, refusal to classify Freedmen as Indians violates the 
Equal Protection Clause. Indian status classifications are only 
justified because of the political nature of tribal membership. The 
Freedmen maintain this political classification—they are members 
of federally recognized tribes—but still flunk the Rogers test. The 
test should be changed to allow Freedmen to be Indians. Denying 
Freedmen federal criminal jurisdiction also violates federal policy 
towards the tribes, which is  focused on the promotion of tribal self-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 It is important to note that despite this argument, the Freedmen are 
distinguishable from the Rogers parties in many ways. Unlike the offender and 
victim in Rogers, who became members of the Cherokee Nation directly through 
the tribe without federal involvement, the Freedmen are deemed members of the 
Cherokee Nation as the result of federal involvement. Because Congress has 
plenary power over Indian affairs, if it gives someone status as a member of an 
Indian tribe, it is different than the person obtaining status as a member of the 
tribe by circumventing federal approval. In addition, the Freedmen’s ancestor’s 
names are on the Freedmen rolls for their respective tribes. It is impossible, 
absent a DNA test, to prove that many of the Freedmen do or do not have 
“some” Indian blood. See Williamson, supra note 59, at 256 (explaining that 
regardless of blood quantum, African-American Seminoles were required to sign 
the Freedmen rolls). Therefore, applying the Indian canons of construction, a 
federal court should give the Freedmen the benefit of the doubt and determine 
that they do have “some” Indian blood.  
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determination. Because all tribes have established blood quantum 
requirements for membership (which the Freedmen are excepted 
from), the government should allow the tribes to determine Indian 
status. 
1. Equal Protection Clause Violation 
 
Denying the Freedmen federal criminal jurisdiction because 
of their race indicates that the Rogers test establishes a racial 
classification that should be subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause, for it is distinguishable from purely political 
classifications related to Indian identity that courts have accepted in 
the past. Racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny and, 
under most circumstances, courts have held that they are 
impermissible; under this standard of review, they can only survive 
if they are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental 
interest, which is a stringent standard to meet.172 However, the 
Supreme Court has determined that classifying a person as Indian is 
not a suspect classification based on race.173 Rather, the Constitution 
expressly provides Congress the ability to single out tribes for 
purposes of legislation because of the Indian Commerce Clause, 
which states that Congress shall have power “To regulate 
Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes.”174 This singling out is not 
based on a racial classification but is instead based on the 
recognition of Indian tribes as “quasi-sovereign tribal entities.”175 
Therefore, federal statutes and federal common law specifically 
pertaining to “Indians” are generally seen as establishing political 
rather than racial classifications, which are subject to rational basis 
review.176 They will survive this level of review if they are rationally 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“[A]ll legal 
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately 
suspect,” meaning strict scrutiny applies.); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 
(1967) (“[T]he fact of equal application does not immunize the statute from the 
very heavy burden of justification which the Fourteenth Amendment has 
traditionally required of state statutes drawn according to race.”) 
173 Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552–53; see also Antelope, 430 U.S. at 646–47. 
174 Antelope, 430 U.S. at 645 n.6. 
175 Id. at 645 (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554). 
176 This “political” classification justifies the entirety of Title 25 of the United 
States Code. See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552 (“If these laws . . . were deemed 
invidious racial discrimination, an entire Title of the United States Code (25 
U.S.C.) would be effectively erased . . .”). 
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related to a legitimate governmental interest.177 Because 
congressional power over Indian affairs is plenary, federal statutes 
almost certainly pass this test; they will almost always be rationally 
related to what Congress deems a legitimate governmental 
interest.178 
 Current Supreme Court precedent indicates, correctly, that 
the Rogers test is constitutional on its face; however, the Rogers test 
is unconstitutional, as applied to the Freedmen. The Supreme Court 
first confronted an equal protection challenge to Indian status as a 
basis of discrimination in Morton v. Mancari.179 There, non-Indian 
employees of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), which is 
responsible for supervising all Indian relations in the United States, 
challenged a policy which the BIA sought to hire Indians over non-
Indians.180 This positive form of discrimination, the Court held, was 
not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause because “the 
[employment] preference, as applied, is granted to Indians not as a 
discrete racial group, but, rather, as members of quasi-sovereign 
tribal entities whose lives and activities are governed by the BIA in 
a unique fashion.”181 The Court reasoned that this “preference is not 
directed towards a ‘racial’ group consisting of ‘Indians’; instead, it 
applies only to members of ‘federally recognized’ tribes. This 
operates to exclude many individuals who are racially to be 
classified as ‘Indians.’ In this sense, the preference is political rather 
than racial in nature.”182 Although the Court here insisted that race 
is not determinant of Indian status, it puzzlingly contradicts its own 
holding in Rogers, that Indian status “does not speak of members of 
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179 417 U.S. at 535. 
180 Id. at 537. 
181 Id. at 554. 
182 Id. at 553 n.24. The most likely reason the Court held that race is not the 
determining factor in Indian status in both Mancari and Antelope is that between 
the times those cases were decided and the times Rogers, Alberty, and Lucas 
were decided, tribes did not adopt non-racially Indian members. See Clinton, 
supra note 2, at n.60. To the contrary, all tribes have biological connection 
requirements for membership. See Part III supra. When an equal protection 
challenge went up to the Supreme Court, the Court could safely say that 
membership in a federally recognized tribe was the determining factor in Indian 
status. However, after the Cherokee Freedmen were granted membership rights 
in 2017, the Court can no longer say that membership in a federally recognized 
tribe determines Indian status. Now, it is clear that race is important. 
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a tribe, but of the race generally.”183 The Mancari Court went on to 
hold that “[a]s long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to 
the fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians [to 
further Indian self-government], such legislative judgments will not 
be disturbed.”184 
The Court applied the same analysis in the criminal 
jurisdiction context in United States v. Antelope.185 In Antelope, a 
defendant challenged his prosecution for felony murder under the 
MCA.186 There was no equivalent felony murder charge under the 
laws of the state where the death occurred, and therefore, the 
defendant could only be tried for felony murder under federal law 
vis-a-vis the MCA.187 The Court rejected the defendant’s equal 
protection challenge, affirming its holding in Mancari that “Indian” 
denotes a political status of a member of a quasi-sovereign tribe, not 
a suspect racial classification.188 According to the Antelope Court, 
in order to be a permissible political classification rather than an 
impermissible racial classification, a relationship between the tribe 
and federal government must exist.189 Therefore, “members of tribes 
whose official status has been terminated by congressional 
enactment are no longer subject, by virtue of their status, to federal 
criminal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act.”190 Furthermore, 
being subjected to federal criminal jurisdiction is not because of race 
but because of membership in a federally recognized tribe.191 This 
seemingly opens the door to the Freedmen, who are members in a 
federally recognized tribe, to challenge their lack of access to federal 
criminal jurisdiction statutes as unconstitutional as applied to them. 
 Finally, the Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Wanoskia, 
inferred that disparate treatment of an Indian under federal law does 
not violate equal protection.192 In Wanoskia, the defendant Indian 
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184 Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554. 
185 Antelope, 430 U.S. at 646–47. 
186 Id. at 643. 
187 Id. at 644. 
188 Id. at 646–47. 
189 Id. at 646 n.7. 
190 Id. Again, this contradicts the Court’s holding in Rogers, that Indian status 
“does not speak of members of a tribe, but of the race generally.” Rogers, 45 
U.S. at 573. 
191 Antelope, 430 U.S. at 646–47. 
192 United States v. Wanoskia, 800 F.2d 235, 239 (10th Cir. 1986); see also 
Prentiss, 273 F.3d at 1280-81. 
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challenged his conviction as a violation of the Fifth Amendment 
because he would have received better treatment had he been 
convicted under state law.193 The court explained that there was no 
disparate treatment, because if the offender was a non-Indian and 
the victim was an Indian, ICCA would apply and the non-Indian 
would receive the disparate treatment.194 Therefore, both Indians 
and non-Indians are subjected to the same jurisdiction when a major 
crime is committed by or against an Indian.195 Thus far, the only 
criminal equal protection challenge a court has viewed as a violation 
of equal protection is where MCA and ICCA provide different 
definitions for the same crime; this is possible because ICCA in 
some instances uses a state law definition of a crime through the 
Assimilative Crimes Act.196 What is clear to the courts is that the 
Rogers test is facially constitutional—race plus membership in a 
federally recognized tribe is a political classification. What is 
unclear, however, is the test’s constitutionality as it is applied to 
non-racial members such as the Freedmen. 
The Supreme Court should review how Indian status—
particularly as it applies to the Freedmen—is used to determine 
criminal jurisdiction under strict scrutiny, for the political 
justification from both Mancari and Antelope does not apply in this 
context. Mancari and Antelope indicate that a classification based 
on Indian status is political rather than racial. Therefore, the Rogers 
test is facially constitutional. In Mancari, the Court justified the 
government’s providing a benefit to Indians because the “preference 
[was] not directed towards a ‘racial’ group consisting of ‘Indians’ . 
. . [but] applie[d] only to members of ‘federally recognized’ 
tribes.”197 The hiring preference applied to tribal members who were 
racially Indian, but it did not apply to nonmembers who were 
racially Indian; therefore, this did not establish a racial 
classification.198 Similarly, the Court in Antelope held that racially 
Indian tribal members being subject to federal criminal jurisdiction 
where racially Indian nonmembers were subject to state criminal 
jurisdiction was indicative of only a political classification. By 
contrast, the Freedmen members of the Five Civilized Tribes of 
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197 Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24. 
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Oklahoma are members of federally recognized tribes, but they are 
denied federal benefits because of their race. Here, the political 
classification does not hold up because the Freedmen are tribal 
members, and the only thing distinguishing the Freedmen from 
those possessing Indian status is a quantum of Indian blood. As 
such, this classification demands strict scrutiny review. 
Under strict scrutiny, classifying the Freedmen as non-
Indians will only be allowed by the Supreme Court if it is necessary 
to serve a compelling governmental interest.199 Maintaining the 
status quo in regards to the applicability of criminal statutes may or 
may not be a compelling governmental interest. And not extending 
Indian status to Freedmen because of a lack of blood quantum may 
or may not be narrowly tailored to serve this or another similarly 
compelling interest. After all, one could argue that there is a greater 
risk of racial Indians being discriminated against by a state jury than 
Freedmen Indians. But a federal court will have to decide this 
conundrum. And there is only one Supreme Court case where the 
Court determined that a racial classification met strict scrutiny, 
which makes one wonder if strict scrutiny as applied towards the 
Freedmen’s classification as non-Indians will be “strict in theory, 
fatal in fact.”200 Given how the standard has been applied in the past, 
the racial classification of Freedmen will likely be struck down 
under strict scrutiny.201 
2. Federal Policy Towards the Tribes is Violated 
 
In addition to violating the Equal Protection Clause, denying 
the Freedmen of the Five Civilized Tribes federal criminal 
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jurisdiction violates federal policy. There are at least three policies 
for the federal criminal jurisdiction statutes discussed in this 
article.202 First, the statutes ensure that a racial Indian who is a 
member of a federally recognized tribe is not discriminated against 
by a state jury.203 There is a problem with this rationale if it is not 
applied to Freedmen members. As is, a person can possess only a 
small fraction of Indian blood and still be subject to federal criminal 
jurisdiction. For example, the Five Civilized Tribes have no 
minimum blood quantum requirement, they just require that a 
member have some racial tie to the tribe.204 A state jury is probably 
just as likely to discriminate against a person for being Indian with 
a relatively small degree of Indian blood as they are to discriminate 
against a Freedmen member who has no Indian blood. 
A second policy for having federal criminal jurisdiction 
statutes for Indians is that it fosters the federal-tribal relationship.205 
The federal government and the tribes are in a guardian-ward 
relationship, and, similar to a trustee’s duty to the beneficiaries of a 
trust, the United States has a duty to work for the benefit of the 
tribes.206 This duty is nearly as old as this country.207 By not 
allowing over 25,000 members of the Cherokee Nation, as well as 
many members of the other Five Civilized Tribes, access to criminal 
jurisdiction statutes, the United States breaches a fiduciary duty to 
the tribes to work for their benefit. Although this would not be the 
first time the United States government has broken a promise to 
work “for the benefit of the tribes,”208 there is no excuse to deny the 
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Seminole Nation of Oklahoma, Tribal Enrollment, http://sno-
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Freedmen members of the Five Civilized Tribes the same access to 
criminal jurisdiction benefits as are provided to racially Indian tribal 
members. 
A third policy for the federal criminal jurisdiction statutes is 
that they exist to increase tribal and tribal member autonomy.209 In 
one of the premier cases on Indian law, Chief Justice Marshall held 
that “the laws of Georgia can have no force” in Cherokee 
territory.210 This idea of tribal autonomy from state laws that applies 
throughout the nation has never been overturned by the Supreme 
Court. Rather, it has become stronger. Federal Indian policy from 
the Nixon administration onwards has been that of self-
determination for the tribes.211 It is inconsistent with tribal self-
determination for the federal government to deny federal court 
access to a large number of members of the Five Civilized Tribes. 
C. Solution: Make the Freedmen “Indians” by Removing the First 
Prong of the Rogers Test 
 
In order to correct the equal protection and federal policy 
violations that have resulted in the Freedmen members of the Five 
Civilized Tribes being recognized as members but not as Indians, 
this paper proposes the following solution: Federal courts or 
Congress should remove the first prong of the Rogers test, i.e. the 
blood quantum requirement. Beyond correcting the constitutional 
and policy-related problems and providing some benefit for the 
Freedmen, removing the first prong of the Rogers test benefits the 
tribes. As the test currently stands, a party can possess quantum of 
blood from a tribe other than the one in which the party is claiming 
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membership and still meet this requirement.212 This does not benefit 
the tribe of which the party is a member because the government is 
essentially devaluing that Indian’s connection to his or her tribe. In 
other words, the first prong of the Rogers test tells us that proving 
lineage which ties back to pre-Columbus America is more important 
than proving a tie to an Indian’s particular tribe. 
There are also judicial efficiencies to be gained by removing 
the first prong of the Rogers test, efficiencies which will most 
certainly be needed by federal courts if the Murphy mandate 
issues.213 First, requiring a biological tie to establish Indian status is 
not necessary. With the exception of the Creeks, Cherokees, 
Seminoles, and Choctaws,214 every federally-recognized tribe 
requires a biological tie to the tribe in order to be eligible for 
membership.215 Because criminal parties must prove membership in 
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Treaty. See Part II.B.1. supra. 
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the second prong of the Rogers test, the first prong is redundant. 
Second, by removing the first prong of the test, courts can accept a 
membership card or enrollment form as proof of Indian status 
without the added burdens the first prong brings, such as obtaining 
a DNA test or testimony from a relative that the party is in fact a 
biological Indian.216 And if no membership card exists, which 
happens often when an Indian’s ancestors did not sign the 
membership rolls, the burden will be on the alleged Indian to prove 
that he receives benefits from the federal government which are 
traditionally given solely to Indians, receives benefits from tribal 
affiliation, and/or has social recognition by the tribe.217 
These efficiencies would benefit all Indians in criminal cases 
and relieve judicial burdens if Indian country expands to include 
almost all of Tulsa. But despite the efficiencies, traditional criminal 
jurisdiction jurisprudence does not accommodate the unique history 
of the Freedmen members of the Five Civilized Tribes of Oklahoma, 
regardless of whether Murphy is affirmed at the Supreme Court 
level. Therefore, courts must consider changing the status quo 
regarding how federal jurisdictions applies to tribal members unless 
they want to promote constitutional and federal policy 
infringements. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Supreme Court precedent indicates that the Freedmen are not 
Indians for purposes of criminal jurisdiction. But courts should 
rethink the logic of this outcome because it violates the Equal 
Protection Clause and runs contrary to federal policy. If the Murphy 
v. Royal mandate issues, it is conceivable that a Cherokee Freedman 
could commit a crime in Tulsa, Oklahoma and still be denied access 
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to federal court. This denial of federal court jurisdiction could be 
crucial to the liberty of such a defendant. For example, like the 
defendant in Murphy, she could be up against the death penalty if 
convicted of murder in Oklahoma state court, but up against life in 
prison if convicted of murder in federal court. She could challenge 
the court’s holding that she is non-Indian as a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause. Her argument would be that it is unconstitutional 
that a racially Indian member of the Cherokee tribe be given access 
to federal criminal jurisdiction benefits and she be denied them 
based solely on her race. At a minimum, the traditional “political 
status” justification from Mancari and Antelope should not apply in 
this context. A much better justification is needed for this racial 
classification. However, if courts were to eliminate the blood 
quantum requirement of the Rogers test while still requiring a 
defendant’s membership in a federally recognized tribe, it would 
solve potential equal protection problems by allowing all Freedmen 
members to obtain Indian status. It would also maintain the integrity 
of the test by not allowing anyone who has merely possesses Indian 
ancestry to be entitled to the protection-based benefits of federal 
criminal jurisdiction statutes. Rather, a person would need to be a 
member of a tribe to obtain access to the statutes. This change would 
give power back to the tribes, who already decide their membership 
requirements, by allowing tribes to decide who is Indian for 
purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction statutes. 
